



Imperial Internationalism: The Round Table Conference and
the Making of India in London, 1930–1932
The International Making of States
In 1919, two events in Paris and London reshaped the Indian world. The first was the
signing of the Treaty of Versailles by representatives of India, which would—unexpectedly
for Britain—make India a founding member of the League of Nations. The second was
the granting of royal assent to the Government of India Act, instituting the political system
called “dyarchy.” This new system meant the devolution of powers to British Indian
provinces, some of which would be administered by elected Indian ministers. Through
these two events, India, first, acquired international subjecthood as a coherent diplomatic
entity and, second, fragmented and dispersed its sovereignty into the provinces of British
(not Princely) India. Both of these processes are relatively well known, and both show how
“India” was making both a new inner and outer state. This was part of an historical
moment in which international organizations were inserting themselves into the
technologies of state-making in unprecedented ways—from the re-ordering of Europe at
Versailles to the making and supervision of Mandated Territories that would follow at
Geneva.1
What is less well appreciated are the contingencies beneath these parallel events in 1919
Paris and London. The Versailles treaty was signed on June 28, while the royal assent was
not given to the India Act until December 23. As such, the India that signed the Paris
treaty was not only a dubiously performative unity of British and Princely India; the
constitution of British India was only legislatively formalized six months after the signing
of the Paris Peace Treaty; therefore the signatory was even more fictional than is usually
acknowledged. The second contingency arises from the first. The Paris Peace Conference
consumed the energies of many leading British politicians for the first half of 1919, precisely
when the Government of India Bill was going through Parliament.2 These included the
ex-viceroys of India Lord Curzon (1899– 1905, acting as Foreign Secretary in 1919) and Lord
Hardinge (1911– 1916, who headed the British Delegation in Paris). Curzon, especially, had
been no advocate of the liberal reforms pursued by Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for
India, since the latter’s declaration of 1917 that the aim of Indian constitution reform was
eventual dominion status.3 Had these men not had their attention divided between
London and Paris, would the Indian reforms have been passed in the form they did? These
contingencies remind us to attend to the messy realities of both international diplomacy
and the technologies of the state. It was the messiness of state-making, and nationalism
forced dyarchy to be revisited within the decade.
The working of the 1919 Act had proven so dissatisfactory to both Indian subjects and
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governors that a statutory commission, directed to review the act’s first decade, was
brought forward to 1928. The all-white nature of the “Simon Commission,” as it became
known, led to such virulent protests within India that, before its recommendations had
even been agreed upon, the British Government announced that representatives from
British and Princely India and Her Majesty’s British Government would meet in London
for a “Round Table Conference” (RTC, November 12, 1930 to January 19, 1931) to discuss
India’s constitutional reform. After a plenary session in which the agenda was set, the
conference divided up into separate committees to consider core topics (federal structure,
provincial constitution, minority communities, franchise, defense, and particular regions),
assisted by a government secretariat, before reconvening to debate its conclusions. The
largest nationalist party, the Indian National Congress (INC), had launched the civil
disobedience movement in protest at the terms set for debate and boycotted the
conference. It found that its demands for Dominion Status (defined by Motilal Nehru in
1928 as responsible government and a degree of autonomy and self-representation within
the empire, as enjoyed by Canada, Australia, New Zealand South Africa, and Ireland) were
not met due to the conference’s acceptance of the goal of a federal Indian, but not
independent, state.4
Congress leader MK Gandhi was released from prison in order to attend the second
session of the RTC (September 7, 1931 to December 1, 1931), to much fanfare, only to be
arrested again on his return to India. Congress and most of the Princes did not attend the
final session (November 17, 1932, to December 24, 1932) of the conference. After passing
through parliamentary scrutiny, the conference recommendations were manifested in the
Government of India Act (1935), which devolved powers to provincial, elected governments
and set in place the procedures through which India could become a federal state. The
conditions for these procedures to be activated were never met, so the federal state did not
actualize until after independence, in 1947.
The sovereign technology of state-making at the RTC enables us to envision it as an
international organization. It brought together representatives of different nations. It
invoked international comparisons with the Dominions and the League of Nations, and,
for some, the inspiration of radical anticolonial and socialist forms of internationalism.
However, to the extent that it is considered in South Asian studies at all, the RTC is read
as a moment of nation-making, of the consolidation of the centrality of congress
nationalism, and of the solidifying of national religious divides.5 That is, although an
international event, the RTC is assumed to mark the collapse of internationalism and the
triumph of nationalism.
In this essay, I would like to suggest that we supplement these readings with continued
attention on the RTC as an international organization, even if it was “imperial
internationalism” that ultimately triumphed by incorporating anticolonial
(inter)nationalisms.6 This argument is made in two stages. First, the influence of the
League of Nations on the conference is examined, by considering its role as model,
precedent, and potential arbiter, and by exploring the time conference delegates spent in
Geneva. Second, the paper assesses the influence of internationalism at the Round Table
meetings, in terms of the form of the conference and the content of some of the brands of
internationalism articulated there. Before introducing Fred Halliday’s typology of
internationalisms, with which this paper critically engages, I briefly introduce the recent
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internationalist turn in South Asian studies—and the emerging interest in conferences as
vibrant political sites—that informs how I present the RTC as an international technology
of state-making.
International India
Over the last twenty years, studies of colonial India (including, though with a lesser
emphasis, those areas that would become post-colonial Burma, Pakistan, and Bangladesh)
have taken an international turn. India’s place within the imperial system, its “jewel in the
crown” status, is widely acknowledged, as is its emergence into international diplomatic
recognition during the 1914– 1918 war.7 The broader significance of Indian technologies of
the state and the military for securing the empire as well as the influence of its policemen
within the broader “Indian Ocean Arena” have also long been acknowledged.8 If these
studies marked India’s reach beyond its national boundaries within imperial networks,
further works have attempted to extract India from methodological nationalism (and
imperialism) by telling its history beyond state-based and imperial geographical frames.9
These have included accounts of international scandals and their domestic effects regarding
Indian sexual practices and legislation, of entanglements between India and Germany, and
the influence of subaltern labor migration across the Bay of Bengal and into the Pacific.10
Prominent within these examples have been anticolonial thinkers and activists who
exploited the international (as both an ideal and series of extra-national networks) for their
own means, with the international functioning variously as an intrusive and judgmental
externality, a source of inspiration and collaboration, or as a place for labor, profit, and
campaigns for workers’ rights. Others have focused on anticolonial internationalists, who
reworked purportedly “western theories” (whether communist, anarchist, or humanist) to
their own ends.11
A recent collection by Raza, Roy, and Zachariah reminds us just how many
international blueprints there were in circulation, beyond the models of the League of
Nations and the Communist International, for remaking the world in the aftermath of the
First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution. Among those listed are pacifism, pan-
Islamism and pan-Africanism, Aryanism, anti-imperialism, suffrage, romanticism,
feminism, temperance, eugenics, and fascism: “Their divergent ends and objectives were
held together, if temporarily, by a euphoria for the vastness and integratedness of the world
and the desire and optimism to remake it and shape the future of humanity.”12 The editors
acknowledge, however, that while nationalism cannot explain the trajectories of
internationalism, many of the agents of internationalism they study viewed themselves as
agents of national liberation; that is, that the internationalist moment in the interwar years
was framed by the principle of nationalism.13
While this may be the case, Manu Goswami suggests that contemporary histories of
internationalism are framed by a shared Euro-American narrative of failure, by turns one
of moralizing judgment and regressive nostalgia.14 This has come to inflect views of
interwar anti-imperial internationalisms that, she insists, were neither reducible to nor
opposed to nationalism. What she calls colonial internationalisms “improvised a distinct
future-oriented politics,” and she calls upon us to write the histories of expectations as
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much as of experiences.15 Rather than recounting a separate history of a colonial or anti-
imperial internationalism, in this essay, I hope to suggest how radical and imperial
internationalisms intersected within the liberal setting of the Round Table Conference.
The RTC marked a technology of the state in which imperialism and internationalism
intersected. The most obvious and institutionalized space in which this also happened was
in Geneva, through the League of Nations. For some, the League facilitated the ongoing
colonial mapping of the globe through its Mandates Commission, precipitating crises of
both empire and internationalism.16 For other writers and administrators who bridged the
imperial and international spheres, such as Alfred Zimmern, Geneva was a space of hope,
promising a “Third British Empire” that could flourish with and possibly through the
League of Nations.17 If it was a place of hope for some liberal-imperial thinkers, the
“Wilsonian Moment” had rapidly faded for anticolonial thinkers from Egypt and India to
China and Korea, who found that self-determination would not be accorded to the subjects
of empire.18
What these debates swirling around Geneva confirmed was that “internationalism” was
(and is) what Fred Halliday called a “cluster concept,” lacking a core meaning but with
recurrent themes.19 These themes include beliefs that an objective process (predominantly
economic/materialist) was driving internationalization; that, in consequence, political
collaboration across national borders was increasing; and that these processes were morally
good and desirable, promoting freedom, tolerance, and prosperity. However, speaking to
his late-1980s world, but drawing upon historical examples and moments, Halliday asked,
“Desirable for whom?” In response, he proposed three typologies of internationalism.
“Liberal internationalism” is based on the optimistic approach that societies and
individuals can cooperate to enhance peace and prosperity, an approach represented in this
essay most clearly by the League of Nations. His second category, which challenges the
first, is “hegemonic internationalism,” which posits that world integration takes place on
asymmetric, unequal terms (and that this could be a good thing). For Halliday, and for
us, this approach is represented by the British Empire and what we can call its “imperial
internationalism.” The third concept, of radical or revolutionary internationalism,
challenges both liberal and imperial forms. The most famous example is Marx’s proletarian
internationalism, but Halliday also listed radical republican, anarchistic, revolutionary, and
Islamic internationalism; anticolonial nationalists represented the most radical
internationalists at the RTC.20
The point, however, is that in the messy realities of the interwar world, these analytical
categories quickly broke down. While “die hard” conservative imperialists attempted to
kill off substantive constitutional reform, they were external voices to a conference mostly
dominated by liberal imperialist views of India’s place within an imperial and
internationalist future.21 While the conference welcomed over 150 Indian delegates, they
were mostly selected because they were moderate, not radical, anticolonialists who viewed
India’s international future as within the empire, for the time being.22 And while liberal
internationalists participated (as politicians, commentators, and experts), they fully
accepted the realpolitik of Britain’s need to consolidate, or at least hold, its grip on India.23
Indeed, the RTC assumed the form of liberal internationalism (the international
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conference) and used it to bring together imperial and anticolonial delegates to thrash out,
over 193 days during three sessions, a national and international future for India.
Therefore, Halliday’s ideal types present useful ways with which to explore the
structural differences between types of internationalism that, in practice, intersected and
hybridized. In this paper, the conference will be treated as a valuable space for
understanding these intersections via knowledge creation, public performance,
legitimation, and protest.24 This allows us to think about the historical geographies of
internationalism: its spaces and networks; the specific performances of internationalism’s
abstractions; and the way internationalism intersected with political projects; namely, here,
the crafting out of an interwar state for India.25 The question to be pursued is: to what
extent was this crafting an international crafting? How did international organizations and
the expectations of internationalism craft India through the RTC (or not)? These two
questions structure the partial answers below, regarding the influence of the League of
Nations on the RTC and rival internationalisms at the conference.
The League of Nations and the Round Table Conference
After Versailles, India became a founding member of the League of Nations. While League
members included Dominions of the British Empire, India was the only non-self-
governing member.26 The British government monitored India’s communications with
Geneva, while the Government of India successfully mobilized India’s supposedly
exceptional status (whether in terms of tropical embodiment, under-development, or
political immaturity) to keep the League’s formal enquiries, and its interpretations of
internal law, out of the subcontinent.27 At the RTC, however, the League’s liberal
internationalism was taken up in new and often unexpected ways by advocates of both
imperial and anticolonial internationalism. Here, we can see the League being appealed to
as model, as precedent, and as arbitrator; in all cases, but to different extents, these appeals
failed. Where the League perhaps exerted its largest influence—though hardest to
trace—was by the lakeside in Geneva itself, where dozens of delegates had learned the art
of internationalism first hand.
Model
In terms of international “conferences,” the late nineteenth century had seen
diplomatic congresses joined by an increasing number of scientific meetings that were
designed to solve the logistical, technical, or epidemiological challenges of an increasingly
globalized world. While lacking the political clout of diplomatic congresses, the technical
conferences established international institutions to coordinate their meetings and pursue
their objectives.28 The interwar years saw a profusion of new international conferences,
augmenting the materialist and political processes of technical and diplomatic meetings
with what Halliday termed the moral processes, and problems, of the new liberal
internationalism: for instance, refugees, disarmament, anti-vice campaigns, and the
trafficking of women and children. Many of these campaigns were taken up by the League
of Nations through the various committees of its social and technical sections.29 While
these committees achieved much, the League also had a pervasive influence through its
nondirect interventions: the way it changed the tone of debates, the statistics and facts it
publicized, the educational materials it provided, and the vocabularies it established; in
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short, the way it established norms and acted as a model of what Halliday termed liberal
internationalism.30
The League acted, alongside affiliated bodies like the International Labor Organization,
as a model not just through what it did, but also how it did it.31 The international relations
and legal scholar Frederick Sherwood Dunn suggested, in 1929, that the profusion of
international conferences in the last ten years could be divided “up between conferences
of the League or of its various organs, conferences convened by the League and held under
its auspices, conferences initiated by the League but not convened by it or held under its
auspices, and conferences not connected with the League at all.”32 The League came to
dominate the field of international conferencing because it, itself, “was intended by its
authors to be a permanent system of international conferences for the purpose of dealing
with political matters from the standpoint of the entire international community as a
whole.”33 Geneva functioned as a near-constant conferencing city, with its various
committees calling in representatives from around the world on a periodic basis. This fast
worked to establish the League’s way of doing internationalism as a model.
The RTC in London sat along a clear and established lineage of British imperial
conferences, of which there were twelve between 1887 and 1937.34 It was immediately
preceded by the 1930 Imperial Conference in London, at which the foundations for the
modern British Commonwealth were laid, such that when Indian delegates for the
forthcoming RTC—including the war veteran Maharajah of Bikaner—laid wreaths at the
Cenotaph as part of the Armistice Day commemoration on Sunday November 9, they did
so alongside the Dominion prime ministers.35 But the India conference was not an
Imperial Conference (see later), and it bore the distinct mark of League organization. On
September 23, 1930, during the run up to the RTC, the Conservative Party Delegation’s
secretary, Robert J. Stopford, wrote to Tory delegate and Party Treasurer Sir Samuel Hoare
that: “Carter tells me that he & his staff will form the Conference Secretariat—available
for the use of all delegates, like the League of Nations Secretariat—& that the combined
British Delegation will have a Secretariat of their own consisting of Dawson of the India
Office (a first rate man) with one Indian & one English ICS [Indian Civil Service]
assistants.”36
Archibald Carter had been appointed the Secretary-General (also the title of the leader
of the League) of the RTC and oversaw its design and every day running. The Conference
was provided with a Secretariat that, again, mirrored the League’s “Permanent Secretariat,”
which functioned as its civil service, although the “The Central Secretariat” was also the
name of the headquarters of the Indian Civil Service in New Delhi. Carter answered to an
advisory committee of the British Government’s India Office, while his staff were divided
into a hospitality committee, press department, finance committee, and those concerned
with the conference directly, who assisted the rapporteurs of the committees and
subcommittees in drafting their reports.37
Although rarely acknowledged publicly, the influence of the League over the
terminology and machinery of the RTC was noted at the very highest-level meetings in
the run-up to the conference. The “Secret Notes of the Indian Round Table Conference
British Delegation Government Members Meeting” at 10 Downing Street on October 10,
1930, recorded Secretary of State William Benn, suggesting that on day two of the
conference an Indian Prince should nominate the prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, as
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chairman: “On being elected Chairman, the Prime Minister would propose that a Bureau
(to adopt a League of Nations name for a Standing Orders or Business Committee) should
be set up.”38
The influence of the League model did reach its limits, however. While many of the
League meetings were open to the public, within the first few days of the RTC plenary
session, the delegates had agreed that the conference should be held in private, due to the
political and religious sensitivities to be discussed, in the context of the ongoing Civil
Disobedience movement in India.39 The precedence of the Imperial Conferences, in
addition to those of the League, were also followed, while the British Government insisted
that it would not treat the RTC as a League conference in London, especially when it
came to paying the costs of its delegates. G. S. Bajpai, Secretary of the British India
delegation, had applied for the same grant to cover his travel expenses from India as the
delegates, on the basis that his previous visit to Geneva had been paid for that way. The
parallel was very quickly put down by the India Office, which insisted, on December 5,
1930 that: “The Round Table Conferences is not a League of Nations’ Conference or the
Imperial Conference. It is unique. It was decided from the outset that officials from India
attending the Conference, whether as Advisors or a Secretaries, should do so on deputation
terms.”40 In terms of formal bureaucracy, then, imperial rather than liberal
internationalism marked British policy. But the latter also worked through influence,
norm, and precedent.
Precedent
If the League inspired the model of the RTC then it also made occasional appearances
on the RTC stage as a precedent that could be cited in favor of certain claims on the
international stage. Here, it functioned not as a deus ex machina—it did not appear
itself—but as an off-stage referent. As noted earlier, India had signed the Treaty of
Versailles when its domestic constitution was not yet completed and when its capacity to
sign international treaties was, at best, in question. Nevertheless, it had functioned for over
a decade in Geneva as a unitary state and, for some delegates, this was proof enough that
a federal India could unify the formally distinct Princely States and British Indian
Provinces.41 In this sense, the League in Geneva functioned as a technology of the state: it
allowed an internally divided sovereign body to function in the international sphere as if
it were a singular and coherent form. Referencing this precedent directly on September 17,
1931, within a Federal Structure Committee meeting during the second session of the RTC,
the Bengal liberal delegate, Sir P. C. Mitter, insisted that if the object of federating was to
increase the strength of the Indian Motherland, then:
Let us suppose a representative of India goes to the League of Nations under present
conditions, and let us suppose that a representative of India goes to the League of
Nations in future, representing a federated India. Cannot that latter representative
hold up his head much higher than any representative, however exalted, however able,
however truly representative he may be, who goes at the present moment?42
On September 14, 1931, Congress supporting Delegate Mr. A. Rangaswami Iyengar had
gone further, referencing international relations more broadly in the same committee. He
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pointed out that there was a precedent for India being accepted as a self-governing and
united “external personality” in “international transactions”:
We British Indians and Indian States, to all intents and purposes, present the
appearance of a united and self-governing India to the outer world in regard to
transactions connected, for instance, with the League of Nations, with the Imperial
Conference, and various other institutions in which, so far as the theory of
representation is concerned, India is treated as a member of the British Commonwealth
to which we all belong. Whether we shall become free and equal partners in the
Commonwealth is the problem which we are going to solve at the sittings of this
Committee.43
The force of Iyengar’s argument was undercut, however, by the hemming in of his
claims and by a misunderstanding of the internationalism of the RTC’s, and his
committee’s, interests. He admitted to only talking about a “theory of representation”;
namely, that India might be perceived as acting unitarily at the League, but that this
allowed Britain to control India’s representation at Geneva. And, secondly, the idea that
India’s international position within the Commonwealth was up for debate at the RTC,
and especially in the Federal Structure Committee (established to confirm the future
internal structure of the Indian state), was out of the question. Speaking on September 15,
the Hindu representative and Gandhi advisor Madan Mahan Malaviya went beyond
India’s representation to the reality of the negative precedent set by the imperial
internationalism in which it was situated. He admitted that if India were granted full self-
government it might find international parity with the dominions. Yet, he noted that
although India’s contribution to the war effort had been praised by prime ministers and
viceroys alike:
One would imagine that, after such utterances, India would be placed on a footing of
equality with the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire. India was indeed
made an original Member of the League of Nations, but that was a sort of comedy
that, not having freedom to govern itself, India should be called on to take part in the
discussion and decision of affairs affecting the freedom of other countries, was
somewhat incongruous. But this is by the way.44
While India’s role in it might have been considered peculiar, the League itself was not,
yet, widely considered by Indians to be a joke or solely a white man’s club (a view that
would spread after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935). In the early 1930s, there were
still those in India who felt that it should appeal to the League to consider colonial
injustices.45 The Hindu Mahasabha delegate Dr. B. S. Moonje, for instance, still had faith
in the League and went beyond calling on precedence to actually suggest the League act as
arbitrator (that is, not as abstract precedent but as a body that could intervene in Indian
affairs).
Arbitrator
Moonje was a divisive figure and explicitly viewed his role as defender of the Hindu
community from the supposedly better-organized and better-disciplined Muslim delegates,
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and their claims to a greater number of seats in provincial legislative assemblies under the
proposed constitution. Throughout the first session of the RTC, he insisted that if the
British granted dominion status to India then the “communal” question would be solved
by Hindus and Muslims themselves. In a meeting with Benn on December 5, 1930, recalled
in Moonje’s personal diary, the Secretary of State for India apparently suggested that
Moonje put his case to obstructionist Conservative politicians to settle, or “better still,” to
hand the matter over to the League of Nations for arbitration.46
Whether this planted the seed in Moonje’s mind is unclear, but he raised the issue
with the prime minister himself on December 9, when he was called to a private meeting
alongside leading Hindu, Muslim, and British government representatives.47 MacDonald
said he needed a proposal on the communal question for the delegates to take back to
India after the first session of the RTC concluded. Moonje insisted that an offer of full
responsible government and dominion status would do, but when this was not
forthcoming Moonje suggested that the League of Nations be brought in to arbitrate.
When both the Hindu and Muslim delegates laughed at the suggestion, Moonje asked
what the League was for, if not to settle disputes? MacDonald was suggested as a conciliator
between the implacable communal representatives, but Moonje insisted if this did not
work then the League should be called upon to arbitrate. Moonje went on to launch a
sustained, if ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to introduce the authority of League liberal
internationalism into the imperially regulated internationalism of the RTC.
Moonje spent the following Sunday preparing a document proving that the League
had helped solve the “minority problem” (of ethnic populations affected by border
changes) in Europe. On December 25, he met the Indian poet and campaigner
Rabindranath Tagore in London, who implored him to meet Muslim demands, but
apparently agreed to sign a petition in support of League intervention should no agreement
be necessary.48 Sir Malcolm Hailey, reporting on a Minorities Sub-Committee on January
1, 1931, noted that Moonje had mentioned a pamphlet on the League (possibly the one he
composed). Yet, Hailey explained, “The latter, of course, allows protection of minorities
to the extent only of providing for their cultural interests and does not go to the extent of
giving them separate representation. He [Moonje] claimed that since India belongs to the
League of Nations she should follow the same principles.”49 The Government of India
would make it very clear in the following years that no League arbitration would be allowed
in domestic matters, in accordance with article 15, paragraph eight of the League covenant,
but Moonje was unaware of this and continued his campaign for League intervention into
the conference.
Between the first and second sessions of the RTC, Indian delegates returned to India
to continue their conference investigations. On January 31, 1931, Gandhi was released from
jail and began negotiations regarding the suspension of Civil Disobedience and Congress
participation in the RTC. On May 17, 1931, Moonje met Gandhi and other RTC delegates
in Simla, the summer capital, where the latter insisted that Hindus must grant all Muslim
demands, as the British would not take a divided India seriously.50 Moonje recorded in his
diary that he refused this “surrender” and that his Hindu Mahasabha (Society) proposals
were fair and “met world standards,” comparing favorably to those set by the League of
Nations, whom he again suggested as arbitrators. Marking a rejection by both imperial
and anticolonial internationalism of Moonje’s appeal for liberal arbitration, Gandhi flatly
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refused. He suggested that it would be a humiliation to admit India could not solve its
communal problem and would need the help of the League; better to boycott the RTC
entirely.
Neither of them did, and Moonje got to put his League arbitration suggestion to
Gandhi again in London on November 4, 1931, in opposition to the latter’s support of
government arbitration. Ten days later, Malaviya was pushing Moonje to accept
MacDonald as arbitrator, suggesting that no one would agree to the League in this role.
Moonje made a last pitch, offering that involving the League would get world opinion on
to the Indian side, making the government unable to say no or to accept the intervention
of the League, thereby forcing it to make a deal. Gandhi refused and, eventually, Moonje
relented, agreeing to sign the request that MacDonald arbitrate himself.
With Gandhi’s attempts to reconcile Hindus and Muslims concluding, in his words
from the Conference, “with deep sorrow and deeper humiliation . . . [in] utter failure,”
the second session of the RTC concluded and Gandhi departed the UK.51 Before returning
to India, he completed a short European tour, taking in Paris, Rome, and Geneva, arriving
at the latter on December 6, 1931. He gave a public talk to an audience of 2,000 at the
Victoria Hall and was visited by Albert Thomas of the International Labor Office (ILO).
In Geneva, Gandhi stayed at Villa Olga, home to the author of his biography, Romain
Rolland. Gandhi’s British police guard reported that a number of “private conferences”
took place at the villa, at which Rolland attempted to convince Gandhi of the merits of
the Soviet system, without success.52 An anticolonial nationalist in the headquarters of
liberal internationalism being wooed by socialist and Soviet internationalists may have
been a sign of Gandhi’s unique appeal.53 But Indians were not unknown in Geneva, nor
were many of the RTC delegates. These personal connections provides the final thread
connecting the League and the RTC.
Lakeside Internationalism
The League of Nations has been shown to have functioned as a model and as a referent
that influenced the RTC, but it also influenced it as a place. Geneva functioned as a
synecdoche for the League, becoming a symbol of ire to opponents of liberal
internationalism and a heady utopia to its advocates.54 But Geneva also functioned as a
thriving capital of internationalism, providing its accommodation, its infrastructure, and
its laborers.55 Across all three delegations and from the highest ranked to some of the
lowest, Geneva had featured in the biographies of RTC attendees: a place where they had
learned the shared crafts of internationalism, of the conference, and—that newly vital
hybrid—the art of international conferencing. The prosopography below must be relatively
fleeting and incomplete, but it gives a sense of the bio-geographical internationalism of the
RTC and the diversity of characters who experienced the lakeside internationalism of
Geneva.56
In terms of the British Delegation, MacDonald himself was no stranger to Geneva,
having made a visit in 1924 in his first term as prime minister where he co-proposed the
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes; he would also attend
disarmament conferences in 1932 and 1933. Sir Samuel Hoare, the Conservative Party
Secretary of State for India (1931– 1935) had been Deputy High Commissioner of the
League of Nations for Care of Russian Refugees in 1921, while fellow Tory delegate Walter
PAGE 41
Legg: Imperial Internationalism 41
................. 19412$ $CH3 03-31-20 13:01:13 PS
PAGE 42
Humanity Spring 202042
Elliot was a British delegate to the League in 1928. The liberal delegate Lord Lothian had
been an early and influential supporter of the establishment of the League, while fellow
liberal Graham White had been a member of the British League of Nations Union
Executive Committee in 1923– 1924 and 1930. The ICS officer Sir Geoffrey Corbett, acting
as British Delegation Secretary at the RTC, had himself represented India at various
international conferences, including the League of Nations Assembly and the ILO in 1929.
Similarly, the RTC publicity officer, George F. Steward, had been a member of the British
delegation to League assemblies and conferences from 1924 to 1930. British RTC delegates,
from politicians to officials, from Labour to Liberal and Conservative, had widely
benefitted from experiences at Geneva.
The academic and adviser L.F. Rushbrook Williams also acted as a substitute delegate
at the League Assembly in 1925, but he was substituting the Maharaja of Patiala, not a
British delegate. At the RTC, he functioned as an advisor nominated by the Chamber of
Princes; the “Indian States” had thirteen members of delegation staff, three of whom were
English. This spoke to many of the intimate and (to some, disconcerting) aristocratic
interconnections between the Indian and British landed elites, but princes of very different
ranks had experience at Geneva.
The tradition of sending one British Indian and one Princely States representative to
the League each year had built up a rich body of experienced men (they were all men)
within Princely elite. Rushbrook William’s employer, the Maharaja of Patiala, who
attended the first session of the RTC, could still claim to have represented India at the
League in 1925 but this faded in comparison to the record of his great rival, the Maharaja
of Bikaner. Having signed the Treaty of Versailles, Bikaner had led the Indian delegation
in 1924 and 1930, before heading from Geneva to London to represent India at the Imperial
Conference, at the Cenotaph service, and then at the first two sessions of the RTC. The
Maharaja of Kapurthala had represented India in the Assembly in 1926, 1927, and 1929,
before attending the second session of the RTC. The Maharaja of Nawangar twice
represented India in both Geneva and London, while the Maharao of Kutch represented
India at the 1921 League Assembly and the 1931 second RTC session. Other members of
the Indian States delegation staff also had, or would later accrue, experience in Geneva.
Sir P. Pattani, was a member of the Indian delegation to the 1932 League Assembly; V. T.
Krishnamachari, after attending the second session of the RTC, served the League
Assembly in 1934 and 1936; while Sir Mirza Ismail, after attending the first two RTC
sessions, led the Indian delegation to the Java Rural Hygiene conference, organized under
the auspices of the League, in 1937.
Within the British Indian delegation there was also rich experience, both Hindu and
Muslim. The Hindu Moderate delegates at the first two RTC sessions, V. S. Sastri and Sir
Ramasawamy Aiyar, had represented India at the League assembly in 1921 and 1926– 1927,
respectively. The aforementioned delegation staff member G. S. Bajpai had advised the
Indian League delegation in 1929 and 1930, while Rao Bahadur Sir A. P. Patro, who
represented the Justice Party at all three RTC sessions, also represented India in 1931.
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, a Muslim delegate for the first two London sessions,
represented India at the League in 1939, at the end of its life; before this, the Aga Khan,
the leader of the Shia Ismaili community who represented Muslims at all of the RTC
................. 19412$ $CH3 03-31-20 13:01:15 PS
sessions, was granted the role of president of the League Assembly in 1937. Yet, as Gandhi’s
meetings in Geneva had suggested, it was not only the home of liberal internationalism.
Sir Bhupendra Nath Mitra, delegate to the first RTC session and then High
Commissioner for India in London from 1931, led the Indian delegation to the
International Labor Conference in Geneva in 1932, while in 1937 (the by then, Sir) H. P.
Mody, an industrial representative at the first two RTC sessions, served as an employers’
delegate at the same conference. By far the most dedicated link between the RTC and
socialist internationalism was, however, not that of a wealthy industrialist but of the trade
unionist N. M. Joshi. He attended all RTC sessions as a trade union representative but
had also been nominated by the Government of India to represent labor interests at the
ILO in Washington in 1919, and then at Geneva in 1921– 1922, 1925, 1929, 1934, and 1947.
Seemingly the man with the most experience of Geneva, Joshi’s motivation was more
international workers’ rights than anticolonial nationalism (see below).
This section has shown that the RTC was established, in part, on the model of the
League of Nations, that it was appealed to as precedent and arbiter, and that it had trained
many of the London delegates in the art of international conferencing. These included
British men from all the main political parties, low and high Indian princes, Indian Hindus
and Muslims, and representatives from high industry and grassroots unions. It remains to
be seen, however, how internationalist the Round Table Conference sessions, and their
outputs, actually were.
International but not Internationalist?
The “Conference Method”
While the following section focuses on how internationalist the RTC was, there are
also doubts over the extent to which it should be regarded as an international conference
at all. This could be because it was too imperial a conference. Imperial conferences are not
typically considered international conferences, and were not listed in standard works on
the subject. In Dunn’s 1929 book, conferences were divided into League or non-League,
political or nonpolitical, bargaining or legislative, and diplomatic or technical. While
conferences between empires (Vienna 1815, Berlin 1885– 1886) and nations (the Hague 1899
and 1907) were listed, those within empires were not.57 The work of Norman Hill,
referenced by Dunn, likewise divided international conferences into those of peacetime,
the League as well as permanent, semi-public, and private organizations; he made no
mention of imperial gatherings.58 Similarly, a database compiled from the League of
Nations Archive lists 271 international conferences as taking place between the Versailles
Peace Conference of 1919 and the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly
in 1946; the six British imperial conferences that took place during this period are not
mentioned, nor are the three sessions of the RTC.59
The Round Table Conferences are not, however, recorded as imperial conferences
either. India was represented at the imperial conferences but the RTC was not classified as
imperial. Being organized by the British Government within one part of its empire, it was
more of a colonial (or national) affair. Neither international nor imperial, the RTC has
been filed under constitutional history. But its imperial significance could not have been
greater, charged, as one influential author put it, with Holding India to the Empire.60 How
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might we appraise the international nature of the RTC as a state-making organization,
beyond the influence of the League of Nations?
Even authorities like Dunn and Hill struggled to define and mark out set criteria for
what an “international conference” was, but they set out various systematic forms of
international conference organization and procedure that had emerged. The RTC as it
actually functioned met most of these, not least aiming for one of Dunn’s chief criteria,
namely “the accomplishment of desired international regulation within the existing
framework of established ideas and perceived social needs.”61 This regulation was, however,
of India by Britain. Despite its incorporation of “private” individuals making it, in Hill’s
terms, “semi-public,” the RTC still most firmly met the criteria for a public conference:
“When an assembly is convened and supported through the instrumentality of
governments, and is composed solely of delegates officially chosen, it is in every sense
public.”62
In terms of Dunn’s work, like international conferences, the RTC did not conform to
any predetermined rules, starting “de novo,” although the acceptance of the invitation was
taken to also be an acceptance of the resulting agenda.63 It was malleable to the objectives
jointly set out by the British and Indian governments; as Dunn put it, “The conference
method is itself nothing more than a tool for achieving desired substantive ends.”64 The
RTC fits into Dunn’s international conference categorizations (of administration) as “non-
League” and (in terms of method) targeted at legislation rather than bargaining on set
terms. But just as Dunn rejected the total distinction of political and nonpolitical as well
as diplomatic or technical conferences, the RTC included seasoned diplomats as well as
delegates with technical expertise, while it also addressed politically international issues
(the relations between states) as well as notionally nonpolitical international concerns
(India’s role in, for instance, international commerce, transportation, and
communications).65 And, in procedural terms, it followed the method set out most
systematically by the League, as previously shown: having an initiator and organizing
center; following the new international model of including state and nonstate
representatives as well as those from smaller-scale, local organizations or communities;
having a loose agenda that was devised during the conference plenary sessions; having
attendees, including delegates, observers, secretaries, and advisors; and participating in
discussions that were recorded verbatim—many of which were printed—despite most
sessions not being open to the public. The conference resulted in an Act of Parliament,
yet this act embodied a relationship between what was explicitly viewed as an imperial core
and a colonial periphery, not a relationship between international dominions.
The Conference Object
Had the RTC ever, therefore, had an internationalist objective, rather than just an
international method and form? If, as Dunn had it, the aim of an international conference
was “the accomplishment of desired international regulation” then, at a superficial level,
one could say it had.66 On October 31, 1929, Viceroy Irwin had clarified that implicit
within Montagu’s 1917 Declaration (with which this paper opened) was the assumption
“that the natural issue of India’s constitutional progress as there contemplated was the
attainment of Dominion status.”67 R. P. Singh has traced the complex lineage of these
claims.68 As early as 1905, in reaction to the administrative partition of the province of
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Bengal, Congress had called for a system of self-governance internationally comparable to
that enjoyed by the Dominions. The government did not concede; but, in 1911, when
reversing Curzon’s partition of the province of Bengal, it proposed devolving powers to
create administrations “autonomous in all provincial spheres.” This call was taken up in
modified form by Lord Hardinge during the war, marking political reform as a domestic
not international concern.69
Montagu, the new secretary of state in 1917, pushed for a declaration recommending
Indian “self-government” within the Empire, but cabinet revisions led by Curzon reduced
it to the declaration of “responsible government.” The constitutional fudge of dyarchy
pleased very few, and soon Congress demands for full dominion status were being repeated.
The future governor of the Punjab and the United Provinces Sir Malcolm Hailey insisted
in 1924 that responsible government need not mean dominion status (that is, an
unrestrained legislature), leading to more forthright Congress demands for full dominion
status in the Nehru report of 1928. Here, responsible government and dominion status
were set to mean the same thing. In making his statement in October 1929, Irwin was
siding with the Congress interpretation (although he would send Hailey to the RTC’s first
session as a consultative official). Irwin’s statement was seized on by many Indian
nationalist delegates, such as M. A. Jinnah (who would become the first president of
Pakistan after leading the Muslim League in the 1940s) during the opening speeches of the
first day of the conference on November 12, 1930. He reminded delegates that the viceroy
had clarified the British government’s position in stressing that the “natural issue of India’s
constitutional progress was Dominion Status.”70 Dominion status, however, quickly
dropped out of sight at the RTC. The question, therefore, becomes: did other strains of
internationalism survive at the conference?
Internationalisms
In a recent edited collection, Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin implore us to focus on
the diversity of voices, sources, and approaches that can help us re-think twentieth century
internationalism, calling attention to the “uneasy alliances and unlikely fellow travellers
across the conceptual borders of nationalism and internationalism, and a broader spectrum
of international thought and action.”71 Cross-cutting the variants of internationalism
suggested by Raza, Roy, and Zachariah, the collection features chapters on religious,
socialist, feminist, capitalist, fascist, and indigenous internationalisms. All of these intersect
in uneasy and unlikely ways with Halliday’s typologies of liberal, hegemonic, and radical
internationalism. The RTC presents a fascinating site in which unlikely and uneasy
alliances between types of internationalism emerged and through which imperialism
emerged triumphant over radical internationalisms, in large part, by using the liberal form
of the conference to focus the debate on federalism as a channel for Indian nationalism.
But this does not mean that the conference did not feature other forms of internationalism.
Some forms of internationalism at the RTC were well established but also, arguably,
on the wane. Just like the League of Nations and dyarchy, modern pan-Islamism had been
born of the First World War. The Treaty of Sèvres, as part at the Paris Peace Conference,
and its treatment of the Turkish Caliph prompted the pan-Islamist Khilafat movement in
the early 1920s.72 Two of its most forthright representatives in India had been the Ali
brothers, who became vigorously targeted by the colonial government after Gandhi took
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up the Khilafat cause in the name of both anticolonialism and Hindu-Muslim unity.
Following the founding of the modern Turkish republic and the suspension of Gandhi’s
Khilafat-supporting Non-Cooperation movement in 1922, support for the Pan-Islamism
in India faded.
The Ali brothers were invited as Muslim delegates to the RTC—Maulana Shaukat Ali
to the second and Maulana Mohammad Ali to the first. Mohammad Ali had rejected
Congress in favor of the Muslim League but his pan-Islamist internationalist vision spoke
less and less to the communal nationalism of the League. The RTC Muslim delegation’s
dealings with the British and “Hindu” delegates were led by the Aga Khan, Jinnah, and
Sir Muhammad Shafi, though Ali proved a dedicated networker and rhetorician. His
plenary speech on November 19, 1930, dwelled on his ill health, recalled his visit to England
in 1920 as part of a Khilafat Delegation, and proposed a federal India (“a Free and United
States of India”) but insisted that it should be formed not through dominion status within
the Empire but through complete independence.73 This was, however, part of a radically
internationalist, not nationalist vision:
I belong to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric. One is India, and
the other is the Muslim world . . . We [Mussalmans] belong to these two circles, each
of more than 300 millions, and we can leave neither. We are not nationalists but
supernationalists, and I, as a Mussalman, say that “God made man and the Devil made
the nation.” Nationalism divides; our religion binds. No religious wars, no crusades,
have seen such holocausts and have been so cruel a[s] your last war, and that was a war
of your nationalism, and not my Jehad.74
During his speech, Ali also pointed out that Irwin had affirmed Montagu’s 1917 view of
India’s trajectory, rejecting the 1924 view of Hailey, whom he was glad to acknowledge at
the conference that day. Hailey was writing regular conference updates to Viceroy Irwin
in Delhi, and on January 1, 1931, he wrote that Ali had taken ill and gathered a series of
delegates around his bed to give them “a dying speech of some duration. He must have
enjoyed himself immensely” although, he quipped, he doubted the audience had shared in
the enjoyment.75
Five days later, Hailey had to write to the viceroy retracting his witticism: Ali had died
on Sunday January 4. As part of his plenary address on November 19, Ali had insisted he
would only return to India with the “substance of freedom” in his hand: “I would even
prefer to die in a foreign country so long as it is a free country, and if you do not give us
freedom in India you will have to give me a grave here.”76 In the event, Ali’s body was
dispatched, after evening prayers at Paddington Town Hall conducted by the imam of the
mosque at Woking, to Jerusalem. There the Grand Mufti of Palestine arranged a burial
within the precincts of the Haram-al-Sharif, in a room facing the Dome of the Rock.77
While his brother would attend the second RTC session, when Maulana Mohamed Ali
departed the conference so did its main driver of Islamic internationalism.
Just as Geneva was the home of both the League of Nations and the International
Labor Organization (both of which emerged out of the Versailles peace conference), so
labor internationalism (alongside liberal internationalism) was represented at the RTC in
London. The history of socialist internationalism is rich and contested, its historiography
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stringing together congresses and conferences, movements and protest, ranging from
communist revolutionaries to trade unionists and liberal campaigns for workers’ rights.78
While M. N. Roy debated the colonial question with Lenin and attempted to bring a more
radical communism to interwar India, the RTC certainly had no place for this
internationalism.79 Rather, industry was represented by delegates like H. P. Mody and
G. D. Birla, while the trade unions were represented by N. M. Joshi, who brought his
extensive experience at Geneva to London, but also brought his nonradical, liberal
discursive approach to worker’s rights.80
Joshi made his case in repeatedly internationalist terms. At his plenary address on
November 20, 1930, he insisted that the workers of India—though illiterate and
ignorant—desired full self-government, in part due to the insufficiency of government
efforts to tame the evils of industrialization.81 While ILO influence had led to some labor
legislation, the influence of Indian and European industrialists had stymied the potential
of these acts. Joshi therefore proposed a set of fundamental rights for workers, adult
suffrage, and the retention of labor as a central or federal subject. While these were
seemingly national-scale proposals, the latter, especially, was framed as a mechanism for
continuing to connect Indian workers to the internationalist regulations of the ILO. Only
if the federal center could ratify legislation for all of India, including the Princely States,
could ILO conventions be transmitted to every worker. But Joshi also spoke out from the
specifics of labor to the broader tone the RTC should adopt:
Lastly, may I say that to-day Labour is not the only matter which is internationally
considered? The tendency to find an international solution to our difficulties is
naturally, and very properly, growing and occupying a wide sphere, and I hope that
our Constitution will be so framed in this Conference that India, as a whole, will be
able to take full benefit of the international action, and India, as a whole, will also be
able to be helpful in the international solution of the difficulties of the world.82
Joshi and his fellow labor representative Mr. Shiva Rao were, however, disappointed at the
work of the first RTC sessions, which, they suggested, made the condition of workers in
India not better, but worse—in no small part due to the failure to guarantee that provincial
labor regulations would continue to adhere to those proposed by the ILO.83 In the second
session of the RTC, Joshi’s comments focused more on internal labor rights than labor
internationalism, while in the final session his only new pleas were for the representation
of aboriginal and hill tribe people.
This failure to pursue a more radically internationalist vision was acerbically noted in
the communist British newspaper the Daily Worker, who had hired Shapurji Saklatvala to
cover the RTCs. After working in Indian industry, Saklatvala had come to London in
connection with Indian Trade Unions before becoming associated with the Independent
Labour Party and then the British Communist Party. Just after the second session of the
RTC began, the Daily Worker dismissed the trivial talk of democracy and constitutional
details by “N.M. Joshi, the imperialists’ principal tame Indian labour leader” who had
failed to advocate universal adult suffrage.84 His internationalist and anticolonial
credentials in question, Joshi’s record at the conference ultimately blends in to those of the
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other delegates for whom the prime concerns remained those of (national) federal structure
and minority agreement.
The pan-Islamism described above marked a political claim made on the basis of a
religious diaspora—just one of many religious internationalisms, some of which relied on
spiritually universalistic claims. As any history of world religion will show, in the early-
modern period trans-state and intercultural networks were pioneered by religious
organizations. While many later supposedly secular international organizations retained
the mark of religious origins (see the “Covenant” of the League of Nations), and others
bridged the techno-scientific and the religious (see the Red Crescent and Red Cross), some
branches of world religions transitioned successfully into “religious internationals” in the
twentieth century.85
The Christian Church in India was the church of the majority of British civil servants
and members of the military, and of roughly five million Indians. As the Indian Christians
delegate at the first session of the RTC, Mr. K. T. Paul, explained during his plenary
address on November 20, 1930, this put the church in a unique position. Religion
connected Indian Christians to the West, and made them particularly conscious of the
value to India of maintaining as many international connections as possible. While an
historic connection, this was also felt to be part (akin to Joshi) of India’s particularly
current internationalist moment:
We are aware and proud of the fact that India, even as a so-called “subject nation,” is
becoming more and more an influence, through her literature and philosophy, and
what I may call her spirit, upon the life and thought and spirit of many nations in
both hemispheres . . . We crave for our India a real place, not merely in the British
Commonwealth, but also in the sisterhood of all nations, a place that is real and
effective for the good of the entire world.86
This internationalist vision was, however, hemmed in by Paul’s fears for the fate of Indian
Christians within a constitution drafted in the heat of communal discord. While the
comments above had come from the end of his speech, it had opened by insisting that
together with the Indian Catholic representative, Mr. Pannir Selvam, Paul co-represented
five million Indians. In an imaginative take on the census statistics, he claimed this was
next to only the Muslims in terms of religious minority.87 He then went on to make special
claims for the unique contribution of Christians to the educational and medical
professions, while the everyday Christian was more likely to be a worker than a landowner.
The immediate political necessity for Indian Christians was not to emphasize their
internationalism, but to obfuscate it beneath the claims of their nationalism:
In all such ways we are the servants of our Motherland and shall always feel proud to
be servants of our Motherland. Though our religion has come from outside, and we
derive from it our deepest and most powerful direction for our private and public life
and relationships, it should be realised that we have been in India for 1,700 years; that
is, for over 700 years before the first Muslim arrivals in India.88
Paul proceeded to cite resolutions from the All-India Christian Council backing demands
for dominion status, but the focus of his demands was for a strong federal state that could
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protect all minorities. Selvam did not play a large role in the RTC, but as part of his return
journey he passed through Rome and pressed upon the British Legation to the Holy See,
George Ogilvie-Forbes, to organize an audience for him with the pope.89 This took place
on February 5, 1931, with a report on the conversations passed back to the Foreign Office
in London. Ogilvie-Forbes was disappointed by the pope’s discretion regarding his views
on the RTC, but Sevlam was then interviewed by Cardinal Pacelli, the Vatican Secretary
of State. Sevlam said that the Indian Catholic community should be pleased with the
decision at the RTC to recognize their churches as Indian, not foreign institutions and, in
principle, for Catholic schools to be maintained at government expense. Ogilvie-Forbes
deduced from this conversation, and a dinner party he held for Sevlam that evening, that
the Holy See was sympathetic to the RTC. While this may have been the case, it seems
that for Indian Christians, including members of the Catholic (Universal) Church, the
adopted tactic was to deny the internationalism of the church, in the hope of securing a
place in the new national constitution.
Who, then, took up the charge of spiritual internationalism at the RTC? Gandhi
would be the obvious advocate, eschewing religious communal identification in favor of
spiritual unity across borders, beliefs, and territories. But this also, it seems, entailed
transcending the political connotation of internationalism. Even this focus on overcoming
nations, or working between them, may have been too much for a political ascetic whose
commitment was to a universalistic humanitarianism. For Gandhi, some have argued,
Indian nationalism was simply the most convenient first staging post for a universal
attempt to save humankind.90
Gandhi had been willing to consider India existing as a self-governing part of the
empire in the early 1920s, but with the rise of the new, more radical generation of Congress
activists, led by Nehru, dominion status was rejected.91 After the 1930 Imperial Conference
and the resulting 1931 Statute of Westminster offered a formal definition of what the new,
modern dominions would be, it became equally clear to the British government that
dominion status would be best dropped. As such, this international frame disappeared in
preparation for a colonial federation that never came.
Conclusions
In reading the twentieth-century, Sluga and Clavin encourage us to reject simplistic
categorizations of its internationalisms: “The historical point is that there cannot be a
simple analytical division between good internationalism (whether pacifist or communist
or liberal) and bad internationalism (whether communist, imperialist or neoliberal).”92
Similarly, Halliday did not condemn hegemonic (imperial) or radical (communist)
internationalism; rather, he used them to question the moral claims of liberal
internationalism. Likewise, I hope here to have complicated readings of the Round Table
Conference that pose the British as heavy-handed imperial autocrats and Indian
nationalists as radical anticolonialists. The liberal form of the international conference,
modeled in part on the League of Nations, brought together both moderate and (some)
extremist British and Indian delegates to debate India’s international and imperial future.
Dominion status, and the international, outward-looking agenda it implied, quickly slid
from view, as federalism became the main topic of discussion. This was an initiative jointly
devised by Indian nationalists and representatives of Princely India, but the conclusions of
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the RTC were widely interpreted as a failure for radical anticolonialists and a triumph for
liberal (not die-hard) imperial internationalism, which would keep India within the British
Empire not as a dominion but as, in all but name, a colony. But this particular iteration
of imperial internationalism had undoubtedly been influenced by anticolonial
(inter)nationalism, the liberal promise of League internationalism, and the ascendant form
of the international conference, reworked here into the shape of a round table.
The Government of India Act (1935), which ultimately resulted from the RTC, created
provincial autonomy for Indian elected ministries (akin to what had first been proposed
by the Indian government in 1911) and dictated that federation would only be triggered
when a set number of Princely States had voluntarily offered to federate. By the time of
the Second World War they had not done so; Indian federation was therefore postponed
until after the war and independence.
The RTC had sustained limited debates about dominion, pan-Islamic, labor and
religious internationalism, but it ultimately marked a triumph of an imperial
internationalism that managed to sustain the anomaly of India’s international status while
offering anti-colonial nationalists only further devolution and democratization at the
provincial level. Congress eventually agreed to seek election to the new provincial
ministries, scoring outstanding victories in the 1937 elections. The future governors of
independent India secured their first direct experience of the art of statecraft in a state
crafted at the RTC in London. While it may not have been a thoroughly internationalist
space, the Round Table Conference was an informal international organization that further
clarified the territorial and diplomatic anomaly of India. It made the Indian state and set
the template for what, in 1947, would become two of the world’s newest, and one of the
world’s largest, democracies.
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